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Welcome to Part 2 of the Special Issue on Model-driven Paradigms for Integrated Approaches to Cyber Defense. In the introduction to Part 1, we discussed the motivation and genesis of the special issue. We argued that a systematic, principle-based, modeling and simulation is more likelyas compared to currently prevailing ad-hoc techniques -to produce lasting, reusable approaches for defensive cyber operations. We also posited that the development of the science of cyber security depends on the emergence of a coherent family of models of relations between attributes, structures, and dynamics of violations of cyber security policy; the network of computing devices under attack; the defenders' tools and techniques; and the attackers' tools and techniques where malicious software plays the central role.
The first part of the special issue was dedicated primarily to modeling and simulation as means to characterize the vulnerability of a system or network to cyber-attacks, and to assess the extent of detrimental impacts that are likely to be affected by the attacks. The second part of the issue -the one you are currently reading -takes a look at modeling and simulation approaches used to devise and optimize the design of the system and the run-time defensive actions that would mitigate the impact of cyberattacks. In the following, I introduce the papers of Part 2.
We begin with a paper by Musman and Turner who use a game-based approach to minimize the risk against a cyber adversary by optimal investments in additional defensive mechanisms. Then, Cho and Ben-Asher show how to optimize the effects of the integration of different defensive mechanisms. Applying software patches is a critical yet expensive part of maintaining effective cyber defenses; to this end Abraham and Nair show how to optimize patch deployment.
The remaining three papers focus on actions that defenders can take while operating the system subject to ongoing adversarial cyber-attacks. Kotenko and Doynikova present a general method for monitoring and assessing the situation and using the assessments to select dynamically the most appropriate countermeasures. Thompson and Morris-King focus on modeling specific countermeasures suitable for mobile tactical networks. Finally, Duan and co-workers propose and model the efficacy of a method that actively and continually changes the flow paths within the system to invalidate the attacker's knowledge.
